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Showing posts with label OBAMA ADMINISTRATION. Show all posts
Showing posts with label OBAMA ADMINISTRATION. Show all posts

Obama Presses Congress for Overhaul of No Child Left Behind Law

President Barack Obama nudged
Congress to overhaul the No Child Left Behind law by the end of
the year and give states and local schools more flexibility in a
student’s education.
In his weekly radio and Internet address, Obama used his
visit May 16 to Booker T. Washington High School in Memphis to
illustrate the impact of demanding tougher education standards
and overhauling schools. The Memphis school is located in an
area besieged by crime, poverty and indifference to education,
he said.
“And just a few years ago, only about half of the students
at the school graduated,” he said. “Just a handful went off to
college each year.”
The turnaround came when a “dynamic principal and devoted
teachers” began “special academies for ninth graders –
because they found that that’s when a lot of kids were lost,”
Obama said. The introduction of advanced placement classes and
vocational courses, along with “a culture that prizes hard work
and discipline” brought change.
The result is that four out five students now graduate, and
about 70 percent continue their education, many the first in
their families to go to college, the president said.
The Memphis school was the winner in the administration’s
Race to the Top initiative, which offers grants for states that
follow the administration’s prescriptions for raising standards
in elementary and high schools.
About $4.35 billion has been distributed to states under
the program.

Story of Improvements

“So Booker T. Washington High School is no longer a story
about what’s gone wrong in education,” Obama said. “It’s a
story about how we can set it right.”
Obama has urged Congress to revamp the 2001 No Child Left
Behind Law to eliminate what critics say are its rigid standards
of academic achievement and benchmarks, and instead permit
changes that get results “while encouraging communities to
figure out what’s best for their kids.”
“We need to reward the reforms that are driven not by
Washington, but by principals and teachers and parents,” Obama
said. “That’s how we’ll make progress in education – not from
the top down, but from the bottom up.”
In the Republican radio address, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison of Texas accused the Obama administration of blocking
increased domestic production oil and natural gas.

Sidelined Production

U.S. energy producers in the Gulf of Mexico, the most
abundant source of oil and gas outside of Alaska, were
“sidelined by a drilling moratorium” imposed after the BP Plc (BP/)
spill last year, she said. “Exploration slowed to a halt,”
costing thousands of jobs.
“Rather than work to increase domestic energy production
and help bring down gas prices, the Obama administration is
seeking to impose more regulations and taxes on oil and gas
companies,” Hutchison said. “This is placing our own valuable
resources out of reach and stifling job creation – their
proposals will actually increase pain at the pump.”
Even after the moratorium was lifted in October, Hutchison
said, only 14 permits have been approved. Before the moratorium,
the government was approving an average of eight deep water
permits a month. As a result, offshore production will decrease
by 13 percent next year because of the permitting delays, she
said.
“The federal government should be processing permits with
urgency — instead it is dragging its feet,” she said.
“We have an abundance of oil and natural gas — now we
need to access it,” Hutchison said. “A comprehensive energy
policy can’t be driven by gas prices or polling numbers.”
A Republican proposal to expand offshore drilling was
blocked in the U.S. Senate earlier this week, after Democrats
failed to advance legislation that would repeal $21 billion in
tax breaks for five multinational oil companies.
Crude oil for June delivery gained $1.05 to settle at
$99.49 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange. Prices fell
16 cents this week and have risen 46 percent in the past year.

The political Black Swan of 2012: Civility and substance

Crazy peaked too early. The fringe candidates pre-marginalized themselves. And that's why my money is on the longest of long-shots in American politics, not a candidate, but a process: A 2012 presidential campaign featuring a serious debate about the issues between thoughtful candidates.
In part, we can thank the first wave of Republican presidential "candidates" who arrived on the scene crowded into a clown car and proceeded to climb all over themselves to distinguish their particular form of high-functioning lunacy from that of the human punch line next to them. 
Among the earliest of these was Sarah Palin, shooting from the hip and usually hitting herself in the foot or causing collateral damage to her family, English syntax or our national dignity. But given what followed her into the race, and how much more statesmanlike the Trumps of this world make her look, one conclusion we can't help but draw is that this is a woman who is best viewed in retrospect.
Palin after all was only ignorant, badly educated, hopelessly inexperienced and wrong on the issues. The Trumps and Gingriches of this world see her those defects and raise her a few. Trump seemed to want to prove that in modern America all you needed was fame, no matter how it was achieved. Yet somehow running beauty pageants, casinos, and guest hosting reality television shows was enough to take this buffoon and launch him to front-runner status among Republican candidates. All this despite the fact that he seems intent on proving that there actually is something more ridiculous than his floppy, chemically enhanced comb-over ... that being what comes out of his mouth.
Trump is low comedy, the Sanjaya of presidential politics. Gingrich is something more malevolent. He actually has some experience but his innovative premise is that a man who failed in politics, was run out of his last high office, and actually dumped his wife while she lay stricken with cancer could actually run on a "values" platform. One of the more common refrains surrounding the Gingrich announcement of his candidacy earlier this week, even from seemingly credible journalists, was that whatever else could be said about him, this is a smart man. Really? How can one be smart and be wrong about so many things? 
Other even fringier candidates, from Rick Santorum to Mike Huckabee to Michele Bachmann, have serially demonstrated why there has never been a plane that successfully flew with only a right wing. You might think the current platform of the Republican right -- which essentially boils down to being anti-science, anti-arithmetic, anti-history, anti-woman, anti-gay, anti-immigration, anti-tolerance, and anti-government (and thus, anti-American in my book) -- would play well but none of these candidates, except for Huckabee, are resonating much beyond single digits in most polls. 
Meanwhile, most of the ways to caricature President Obama are no longer available. It can't be said that he is weak on defense or that he hasn't reached across the aisle to make budget deals happen or that he isn't working for free trade or key business interests. You can disagree with his policies but the blunt instrument rhetoric of the most extreme candidates is not going to work. The Osama raid and last December's budget deal are just two of the reasons that is the case, with the gradual recovery of the economy perhaps the most important.
What all this suggests is that we may actually end up with the Republican Party defying the fear-mongering of the pundit class and actually nominate a more sensible, experienced candidate. This is not far-fetched. In fact, that's what they usually do. Look at the field, the ones who look most like Republican presidential candidates are Mitch Daniels, Mitt Romney, and Jon Huntsman. And my bet is that once that huffing and puffing of the primaries is done, it will be one of them running against Barack Obama for the presidency.
And if it is, we might actually end up with a debate about how to actually tackle the budget, fix health care, and remake U.S. foreign policy for a changing world. We might end up with both sides treating each other with a modicum of respect ... and more surprisingly, doing the same with the voters. Oh sure, double-talk and impossible promises will fill the air. And some extremist groups will buy ad time to spew their hatred. 
But here's what I think: Americans are sick of the nonsense, they take our many problems seriously, have come to recognize the president as a serious man whether they like him or not, and want a real alternative to the mainstream nonsense of Washington. And, there would be no better alternative than a campaign that aspired to be worthy of the office and the issues that are at stake.

Crossroads: Can We Win in Afghanistan?

The death of Osama bin Laden will raise the inevitable question: What are we still doing in Afghanistan? The answer, of course, is that the mission in Afghanistan is about something bigger and more ambitious than eliminating Al Qaeda's leaders-most of whom, in any event, are probably living in Pakistan, as bin Laden was when the United States finally tracked him down. No, the mission in Afghanistan isn't about killing Al Qaeda members. It's about stabilizing the country so that it can never again serve as the hotbed of extremism that it was until 2001, with all of the attendant national security and human rights problems that resulted.
But that in turn raises other questions: Is it worth prolonging a war that has stretched on for nearly ten years for that broader goal? And perhaps the most difficult question of all: Even if that goal is worth fighting for, is it actually achievable? 
Over the past few years, a consensus has formed in Washington that the answer to that last question is a resounding no. For years, war in Afghanistan has been portrayed as a hopeless failure. The government in Kabul, we have been told, is corrupt and predatory. The Afghan army is a mess. Tribal loyalties trump national loyalties. The Taliban is gaining in strength.
All of this rendered a decision made by President Obama last autumn rather odd-at least on the surface. Obama had long promised that American troops would begin leaving Afghanistan in the summer of 2011. As Vice President Joe Biden had explained: "In July 2011, you're going to see a whole lot of people moving out. Bet on it." But then, over the course of a week in November, the White House announced a major reversal of course: A large-scale troop presence would remain in Afghanistan for an additional three years, until 2014.
To read the rest of this article, visit TNR.com, where this was originally published.
Peter Bergen, the editor of the AfPak Channel, is the Director of the National Security Studies Program at the New America Foundation, a senior fellow at New York University's Center on Law and Security, and the author of The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America and Al Qaeda. He is a national security analyst for CNN.

One stop shopping for FP's Osama bin Laden coverage

Below is a list of Foreign Policy's and the AfPak Channel's coverage of the death of Osama bin Laden, which we will update regularly. Be sure to sign up for our AfPak Channel daily brief to get the latest news every morning.
Analysis
News from The Cable
Photo essays
ADEK BERRY/AFP/Getty Images

Targeted killings and two worlds in Afghanistan: inside the Takhar attack

On September 2, 2010, ten men in northern Afghanistan were killed in an air attack that was a targeted killing, part of the U.S. Special Forces ‘kill or capture' strategy. The U.S. military said it had killed the Taliban deputy shadow governor of Takhar, who was also a ‘senior member' of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU): one Muhammad Amin, as well as "eight or nine other insurgents."
Many Afghans, including senior government officials, were incredulous. Many knew the man who had actually been targeted -- who was not Muhammad Amin, but Zabet Amanullah. He had not fought for the Taliban since 2001 and had been out campaigning for his nephew in Afghanistan's parliamentary elections with more than a dozen other men, mainly extended family members. That very morning, as per usual, he had called in to the district police chief to check on security before the election campaign convoy set off. The strike was an "obvious mistake," said the provincial governor, Abdul-Jabar Taqwa. "He was an ordinary person and lived among normal people," said the Takhar Chief of Police, Shah Jahaan Nuri. "I could have captured him with one phone call."
U.S. Special Forces got the wrong man, but despite overwhelming evidence, they have remained adamant that they were correct. Senior Special Forces officers' gave me lengthy accounts of the attack, including the intelligence behind it. That has allowed a piecing together of what went wrong.
Intelligence analysts were monitoring the calls of Muhammad Amin in early 2010 -- and confirmed that he really was the Taliban deputy governor of Takhar. They came to believe that one number he had called in Kabul was passed on to him. They believed he began to use this phone and to ‘self-identify' as Zabet Amanullah. In other words, they believed Muhammad Amin was using the name ‘Zabet Amanullah' as an alias.
Friends and family have confirmed that Zabet Amanullah, who was living in Kabul, was in occasional telephone contact with active members of the Taliban, but this is not unusual in a country where fortunes change and it is prudent to stay in touch with all sides. Zabet Amanullah also kept in touch with senior members in the government. What may have looked like a suspicious cluster of calls and contacts, in reality, proved nothing about the actual conduct of the caller. Zabet Amanullah's life, lived quietly and openly at home in Kabul, has been documented in detail. I met him in 2008 when he had just fled Pakistan where he had been working on a human rights project. He had been detained and severely tortured by the Pakistani intelligence agency, he believed, because he was a former Taliban commander who was not fighting.
The Special Forces unit denied that the identities of two different men, Muhammad Amin and Zabet Amanullah, could have been conflated. They insisted the technical evidence that they were one person was irrefutable. When pressed about the existence -- and death -- of an actual Zabet Amanullah, one officer said, "We were not tracking the names, we were targeting the telephones."
Yet in the complex political landscape of Afghanistan, it is not enough to track phones. It is certainly not enough to base a targeted killing on. The analysts had not built up a biography of their target, Muhammad Amin ---where he was from, what his jihadi background was, and so on. They had not been aware of the existence of a well-known person by the name of Zabet Amanullah. They had not had access to the sort of common, everyday information available to Afghans watching election coverage on television. They had not made even the most basic background checks about a target they had been tracking for months. Instead, they relied on signals intelligence and network analysis (which attempts to map insurgent networks by monitoring phone calls), without cross-checking with any human intelligence.
Dealing with the U.S. military, it has felt like we are from parallel worlds. Their Afghanistan, where knowledge is often driven largely by signals intelligence and reports provided by a very limited number of local informants, with a very narrow focus on insurgent behaviour, and the normal, everyday world of Afghan politics. In the case of the Takhar attack, these two worlds simply did not connect.
The human cost of killing ten civilians and turning forty women and children into widows and orphans is great. Legally, the magnitude of the intelligence failings may have been so great that the U.S. military violated the rules of war, whereby combatants must take all feasible precautions to protect civilians. However, there are strong indications that the flaws in intelligence highlighted by this case are systemic. Indeed, General David Petraeus spoke about this, about the U.S. military's lack of a "granular understanding of local circumstances," by chance, on the very day of the Takhar attack.
For the U.S. military, simply reiterating that they were right, in response to overwhelming evidence to the contrary is not an adequate response and will hardly reassure Afghans that similar mistakes will not be made in future.
Kate Clark, a senior analyst at the Afghanistan Analysts Network, is the author of an investigation into the Takhar airstrike, from which this is excerpted. The investigation was featured in PBS' Frontline's "Kill/Capture" documentary. Join the AfPak Channel at 1:00pm EST on May 11, 2011 for a live chat about the film with Frontline journalists Stephen Grey and Shoaib Sharifi.

"Kill Capture": A live chat with PBS' Frontline

Tonight (May 10), PBS' Frontline is airing "Kill/Capture," a six-month investigation into the U.S. military's program of targeted killings in Afghanistan. The military says these raids have taken some 12,000 insurgents off the battlefields of Afghanistan over the last year, and represent a crucial part of the U.S.'s strategy in the country. Afghan government officials, Afghan communities, and human rights groups, on the other hand, have objected to the raids on the grounds that they alienate the local population and are unduly harsh. The question is: will the kill/capture missions help end the war in Afghanistan?

"Kill/Capture" features research by Kate Clark, whose work we have regularly featured on the AfPak Channel, at the Afghanistan Analysts Network, which has just released a devastating new report investigating a U.S. airstrike in Afghanistan's Takhar province in the fall of last year, claiming that civilians were killed in a case of mistaken identity. The report is based on interviews with survivors of the airstrike, witnesses, Afghan officials, and U.S. Special Forces officers. The U.S. military insists the strike killed a senior member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Who was killed in the Takhar strike, and why?

Given that a targeted American raid recently killed al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, we have lots of questions about how these operations are authorized and carried out, and what their impact has been on both the insurgency in Afghanistan and the Afghan communities in which they occur.

Join us tomorrow (May 11) at 1:00pm EST here for a live chat with Frontline's Stephen Grey and Shoaib Sharifi. Grey is a London-based journalist who has been reporting on the Afghan war since 2007, and Sharifi is an award-winning journalist with extensive experience in Afghanistan. Watch a preview of the film here, and be sure to tune in this evening for the full show.

The white man's jihad

Up in the north of England, a trial is being heard against a group of men allegedly at the core of a cell recruiting and radicalizing individuals to fight in Afghanistan. The group, part of an ongoing trickle of people from the U.K. attracted to fighting in South Asia, is notable because it counts amongst its ranks a white convert, the latest in a long line of such individuals who have been drawn to militancy in South Asia. These reports of white converts in the region are naturally of particular concern to Western security services: their capacity to blend effortlessly back into the West makes them highly attractive weapons for groups seeking to launch terrorist attacks.
Back in mid-2009, an older moderate Muslim convert in London told me that his theory behind converts in terrorist cells was that they played a key role as catalysts. The presence of a convert, usually a zealous individual who had moved from a troubled past as drug addict or petty criminal to Islamist extremist, would reinforce the group's internal dialogue and help push them deeper into their militant ideologies.
The group who bombed London's public transport system on July 7, 2005 is the archetypal example of this. Convert Germaine Lindsay, originally of Jamaican descent, was the most overtly violent and radical of the group and may have played a role stirring the others on. According to information released during the recent Coroner's Inquest into the bombings, he was likely involved in a gun crime incident prior to the bombing, he was reported to have been active in promoting radical groups in Luton. Additionally, he was a close student of the radical preacher Abdullah el Faisal. His presence amongst the otherwise Pakistani-Beeston group would have been as an outsider, but one who was brought into the closest of confidence, suggesting an outsized influence.
In a separate case in East London, Mohammed Hamid, also known as "Osama bin London," was a "revert" who found his religion after a life of drugs and became a key figure in a radicalizing network training, amongst others, the July 21 team who tried to bomb London two weeks after the successful July 7 cell. And there are other examples. Looking at other failed plots linked to Waziristan, the 2006 plot to bomb airlines concurrently on transatlantic routes counted a couple of converts amongst plotters, and the 2007 plot to attack a U.S. airbase in Germany was conducted by a group of mostly Caucasian German converts.
On the battlefields of Afghanistan and Pakistan, however, these light-skinned converts face a high degree of skepticism: for example, Rahman Adam, aka Anthony Garcia, one of the plotters involved in the 2004 plot to blow up a British mall using a fertilizer based explosive, was initially turned away from training camps for being "too white." Adam was in fact of Algerian origin and a born Muslim; he was just very pale skinned.
Prior to al-Qaeda's attacks of September 11, 2001, the route for converts to training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan was much easier to tread. James McLintock, nicknamed the "Tartan Taliban," first joined the jihad against the Soviet Union in the late 1980s after, by his account, he met a group of young Saudi hotheads on a flight to Pakistan as he made his way to visit a University friend. Enjoying this first taste of jihad, McLintock became a feature of the European jihadi scene, joining the fighting again in Bosnia and returning regularly to Afghanistan. Back in the U.K. alongside fellow convert and jihadi traveler Martin "Abdullah" McDaid, McLintock began running study circles at the Iqra bookshop in Beeston, northern England and training camps in the nearby Lake District that were attended by some of the July 7, 2005 cell.
And in the years immediately before September 11, there was a stream of converts who showed up and were accorded quite high levels of trust by al-Qaeda. In 1997, having converted a few years earlier in Orange County, California, Adam Gadahn made his way to Pakistan and then to Afghanistan. Using contacts he had made in the U.S., he arrived and seems to have been able to fill a vital early role as translator of Arabic material into English. By 1999 converts seemed to be arriving into South Asia from all directions. Sometime in the middle of the year Christian Ganczarski, a German-Polish convert who used the same network to get to Afghanistan as the Hamburg Cell that produced Mohammed Atta, a leader of the 9/11 group, arrived in Quetta, Pakistan and after a trip back to Germany to fetch his family, moved into Osama bin Laden's compound in Afghanistan, where he acted as the I.T. guy. At around the same time, itinerant Australian jihadist David Hicks showed up and trained with Lashkar-e-Taiba near Lahore -- he tried to go and fight in Kashmir, but ended up going to train at the Al Farouq camp near Kandahar the next year, where he met a bunch of fellow peripatetic westerners including British convert Richard "shoe bomber" Reid. Early 2000, Jack Roche, a burly Australian-Brit who had converted and joined the Indonesian al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah, showed up on the recommendation of Hambali, the operations chief for the Indonesian group, to train and learn explosives and got to sit down and eat with Osama bin Laden.
Post-9/11 converts have continued to play a role in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but few appear to have continued to rise into senior roles as they had before. According to British security sources, one of the most senior was British-born Hindu convert Dhiren Barot, who was incarcerated in November 2006 in the U.K. after a long career as a jihadist foot soldier. Starting with fighting with Lashkar-e-Taiba in Kashmir in 1995, an experience he wrote about in his 1999 magnum opus "The Army of Madinah in Kashmir," Barot went on to help 9/11 plotter Khalid Sheikh Mohammed with his global jihadist planning.
Since 9/11 instead white converts in Afghanistan and Pakistan have mostly been foot soldiers, with the militant groups there more skeptical of converts as potential Western intelligence agents. The Caucasian-seeming Rahman Adam was unable to go and train until he had connected with established jihadist Omar Khyam. An exception to this seems to have been Bryant Neal Vinas, a Queens, New York-born kid who converted to Islam, who made his way to training camps in Pakistan in September 2007 seemingly using networks from the U.S. to establish contact with radicals. It took him a bit longer to establish his bona fides, but eventually he got to meet with an array of high- and mid-ranking al-Qaeda fighters who immediately saw his potential as an operative who could easily blend back into the West.
The Waziristan-based Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) seems to have recognized this potential in a group of German converts who showed up to fight alongside them in the mid-2000s. Having trained a group of them, they sent a cell led by converts Fritz Gelowicz and Daniel Schneider to target the U.S. base in Ramstein, Germany. Other converts linked to the group instead fell in battle, including Eric Breininger who in April 2010 died in Pakistan, while the group was initially motivated by the death in Chechnya of fellow convert Thomas Fischer in late 2003. Another just disrupted alleged German network included another convert and helping funnel fighters to South Asia.
And the trickle goes on. In July 2010, Khalid Kelly, infamous Irish convert and former member of British extremist group Al Muhajiroun, returned home to Ireland having claimed he tried to join jihadists in Pakistan (although he was interviewed in the Times in November 2009 saying he was training to go to and fight in Afghanistan). In Kelly's own words, however, "as a white convert, I stuck out like a sore thumb," so he returned to Ireland instead. Others met with messier ends: according to Pakistani intelligence reports two white British converts were killed in a drone strike in Datta Khel in December 2010.
The pre-9/11 days of converts showing up and getting to meet al-Qaeda leaders are over, but these light-skinned jihadis remain a key potential threat that militant groups will attempt to actively recruit. They both help show off the group's ongoing international appeal while also acting as excellent weapons to strike deep in the West. And until the overall threat has been eliminated, they will continue to be a feature of it.
Raffaello Pantucci is an Associate Fellow at the International Center for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR). 
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