My Blog List

Showing posts with label AFPAK. Show all posts
Showing posts with label AFPAK. Show all posts

Crossroads: Can We Win in Afghanistan?

The death of Osama bin Laden will raise the inevitable question: What are we still doing in Afghanistan? The answer, of course, is that the mission in Afghanistan is about something bigger and more ambitious than eliminating Al Qaeda's leaders-most of whom, in any event, are probably living in Pakistan, as bin Laden was when the United States finally tracked him down. No, the mission in Afghanistan isn't about killing Al Qaeda members. It's about stabilizing the country so that it can never again serve as the hotbed of extremism that it was until 2001, with all of the attendant national security and human rights problems that resulted.
But that in turn raises other questions: Is it worth prolonging a war that has stretched on for nearly ten years for that broader goal? And perhaps the most difficult question of all: Even if that goal is worth fighting for, is it actually achievable? 
Over the past few years, a consensus has formed in Washington that the answer to that last question is a resounding no. For years, war in Afghanistan has been portrayed as a hopeless failure. The government in Kabul, we have been told, is corrupt and predatory. The Afghan army is a mess. Tribal loyalties trump national loyalties. The Taliban is gaining in strength.
All of this rendered a decision made by President Obama last autumn rather odd-at least on the surface. Obama had long promised that American troops would begin leaving Afghanistan in the summer of 2011. As Vice President Joe Biden had explained: "In July 2011, you're going to see a whole lot of people moving out. Bet on it." But then, over the course of a week in November, the White House announced a major reversal of course: A large-scale troop presence would remain in Afghanistan for an additional three years, until 2014.
To read the rest of this article, visit TNR.com, where this was originally published.
Peter Bergen, the editor of the AfPak Channel, is the Director of the National Security Studies Program at the New America Foundation, a senior fellow at New York University's Center on Law and Security, and the author of The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America and Al Qaeda. He is a national security analyst for CNN.

One stop shopping for FP's Osama bin Laden coverage

Below is a list of Foreign Policy's and the AfPak Channel's coverage of the death of Osama bin Laden, which we will update regularly. Be sure to sign up for our AfPak Channel daily brief to get the latest news every morning.
Analysis
News from The Cable
Photo essays
ADEK BERRY/AFP/Getty Images

Afghanistan's ongoing election drama


Earlier this week, Afghan parliamentarians complained that Afghan President Hamid Karzai is still actively investigating the conduct of last September's parliamentary vote, and ongoing investigations by the Karzai-appointed Special Elections Tribunal threaten to unseat up to 80 of the certified winning parliamentarians, five months into the body's term of office. It is unclear which prliamentarians are being investigated or what they are accused of doing, however, because the tribunal has kept its findings secret. Afghanistan's Free and Fair Election Foundation (FEFA) has further criticized the tribunal for inspecting ballots without observers present and for failing to apply international standards in its work.
The Tribunal claims a dubious legal mandate to prosecute perpetrators of election fraud and remove guilty candidates from office. It was created by a presidential decree outside of the judicial framework of the Afghan constitution or its electoral law, and has been denounced as illegal by both the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and the parliament. Nevertheless, Karzai refuses to disband it, and ambiguities in the constitution (and uncertainty over who even gets to interpret the constitution) have created a legal fog around the question of whether members of parliament who are under investigation could actually lose their seats. Given the lack of an independent judiciary in Afghanistan, MP's cannot be sure that there will be any recourse in the Afghan courts for a political decisions made by the Tribunal.
The fate of the Tribunal matters in the short term because President Karzai is expected to put forward at least seven cabinet nominations in the next few weeks that require parliamentary approval. A seat in parliament is a significant source of both patronage and pride, and potentially costs tens of thousands of dollars in campaign funds to obtain. Therefore, the threat of an adverse finding by the Tribunal remains a potent political pressure point against sitting members of parliament to vote for Karzai's nominees.
Continued operation of the Tribunal is also a long-term issue, because its existence undermines the independence of the lower house of parliament (Wolesi Jirga) and the rule of law. Many Afghans view the current battle as a test case for whether Karzai can get away with overstaying the constitutional two term limit for the presidency in 2014. Many longtime observers also fear a repeat of the pattern that was followed after the 2005 elections, when the international community ignored electoral issues until just before the 2009 elections, at which time it was too late to implement effective reforms.
Buying Votes and Blocking Reforms
Leading opposition figure Dr. Abdullah Abdullah said recently in public remarks at the U.S. Institute of Peace that the Tribunal was used to influence the vote over the Speaker of the Parliament, which went to a relatively unknown Uzbek candidate after Karzai's preferred candidate Abdul Rasul Sayyaf deadlocked with opposition MP Yunus Qanooni for votes. Many expect the same strategy to be used to promote otherwise unpopular ministers. In addition to upcoming votes on Cabinet appointments, one can imagine the leverage of investigations being used to encourage cooperation on votes regarding the Strategic Partnership Agreement with the United States and reconciliation with the Taliban.
The Special Election Tribunal is also being used as a weapon against the Chairman and Chief Electoral Officer of the Independent Election Commission (IEC) as well as former Electoral Complaint Commission members. The IEC's bold action against fraud during the election prevented several Karzai allies and prominent power-brokers from winning seats. The international community has supported the IEC's work, but keeping electoral officials under investigation has severely limited their ability to promote positive electoral reforms in the wake of two manifestly bad elections in 2009 and 2010. If the composition of the Parliament is ultimately changed through an extra-legal process, it will gut the authority of the IEC and Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), making it nearly impossible to establish strong and independent electoral authorities for the 2014 elections.
Legitimizing the work of the Tribunal would also undermine efforts to make needed electoral reforms. The IEC, many parliamentarians, the political opposition, international community, and election and democracy experts generally agree on what is needed to sustain the democratic system in Afghanistan, including establishing a reliable voter registry and changing the voting system to empower political parties. The problem is that the Afghan government views the old system, which has produced two highly fraudulent elections, as working toward its advantage, and Karzai has demonstrated no desire for reform. 
While the international community supports a reform agenda, it lacks the stamina and political will to continue focusing high-level diplomatic attention on the issue. The international community has been particularly marginalized by continuing attacks from Karzai, who accuses foreigners of committing fraud themselves, and using electoral mechanisms to plot his downfall. The shrinking of space for public dialogue on electoral reform by the international community plays to Karzai's political advantage, because it further saps energy from the task and cedes the field to Karzai and his allies.
Right Problem, Wrong Solution
The 2010 elections were full of irregularities, to be sure. But much of the most egregious fraud was addressed by the IEC, which excluded 1.3 million tainted votes from the final tally, and the ECC, which excluded at least 34 candidates for election related misconduct.
The problem was that the electoral authorities' fraud investigations were not well communicated to the public or the candidates. Losing candidates complained to Karzai that they were unfairly treated, and there was little evidence to the contrary. Many of them were either allies or representatives of key constituencies of the president, and rather than supporting the electoral authorities he appointed, he sided with the losing candidates and ordered his attorney general to investigate.
According to the Electoral Law, the IEC and the ECC have ultimate jurisdiction over election related complaints. Therefore, the Tribunal has no authority to revisit or overturn the certified election results and their ballot counting exercise is rightly criticized as an illegal, or at least irrelevant. As a separate matter, it is possible that if either a candidate or an electoral official committed a crime, such as buying votes, that action could merit their removal from office. But such criminal charges must be investigated by the attorney general and then prosecuted in an independent court applying all the Afghan laws of due process (including an open trial and an opportunity for defendants to see and refute available evidence). In this case, however, the Tribunal is acting as both prosecutor and judge, despite its apparent lack of any legal authority.
As the matter drags on, with broken promises by the president to the parliament that he would disband the Tribunal (note again that the request goes to the president and not to the Supreme Court for that authority), the government is claiming that no decisions will be taken without full rights of appeal up to the Supreme Court. It is too late to rescue the court's legitimacy, however, because its investigations have already been conducted outside the bounds of a court's role under Afghan law. More likely, this change in position was designed to keep the pressure on parliamentarians by indicating that the cloud over their tenure could remain there through years of appeals.
Pressing for Reforms
The international community has largely ignored the Special Elections Tribunal, and it might be tempting to dismiss its work as mere political posturing that will probably have no ultimate effect on the results. The danger of this approach is that it fails to account for the damage the tribunal is doing to the legitimacy and effectiveness of parliament as a check on executive power in Afghanistan. It also discounts the deleterious effects that the political manipulation of the electoral system has on the judicial process and the rule of law.
The stakes of this game are high. If the international community ignores the details of due process in this case, then it will send a strong signal to the government that when it comes to more important matters down the road, including ultimately whether President Karzai must abide by the constitution's two-term limit, there is room to negotiate. This step could be very destabilizing as the United States seeks a peaceful withdrawal from Afghanistan.
The international community therefore needs to make it clear both publicly and privately that it will not view any removals by the Tribunal as legitimate until all due process has been accorded under Afghan law - including a public trial in which the defense has an opportunity to review and rebut the evidence involved. The international community should go further and declare that the Special Elections Tribunal is an illegitimate arbiter of election results, and reaffirm its prior commitment to the decisions of the IEC. Additionally, the international community should privately seek a deal in which the Tribunal is disbanded soon, even if that includes endorsing changes to the leadership of the "power ministries: like Interior, Defense, and Finance it would not otherwise prefer.
Looking ahead to the scheduled 2014 elections, it is clear that in the current political environment the main actors and the main impetus for electoral reform must come from Afghans. Based on meetings with IEC officials and groups working with parliament, there seems to be a strong and coherent desire by different Afghan groups to push the reform agenda. The problem is that those groups are themselves marginalized by a lack of international attention and resources and by the Special Election Tribunal's secret investigations. 
While it may upset Karzai, there must be a bridge of international support between reformers within political parties, parliament, and the IEC to press for changes to the electoral system if the 2013 or 2014 elections are to have any chance at being more legitimate than the past two. This includes having an electoral law that is properly passed by the parliament, and that reforms the voting system and strengthens the independence of the electoral management bodies. The international community must also support the creation of strong political parties that can better engage voters and police the system themselves rather than relying on the international community to do it for them. 
Perhaps most importantly, the international community should engage in a dialogue with President Karzai to illustrate the need for a peaceful political succession after his term ends in 2014, in order to cement his legacy as a successful Afghan leader. Otherwise, government attempts to undermine the parliament and the electoral authorities could wind up crippling the democratic system itself, and not just a few political opponents.
Scott Worden is a Senior Rule of Law Advisor at the U.S. Institute of Peace.  He served as a Commissioner on the 2009 Afghanistan Electoral Complaints Commission and was an observer of the 2010 Parliamentary Elections. 

Targeted killings and two worlds in Afghanistan: inside the Takhar attack

On September 2, 2010, ten men in northern Afghanistan were killed in an air attack that was a targeted killing, part of the U.S. Special Forces ‘kill or capture' strategy. The U.S. military said it had killed the Taliban deputy shadow governor of Takhar, who was also a ‘senior member' of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU): one Muhammad Amin, as well as "eight or nine other insurgents."
Many Afghans, including senior government officials, were incredulous. Many knew the man who had actually been targeted -- who was not Muhammad Amin, but Zabet Amanullah. He had not fought for the Taliban since 2001 and had been out campaigning for his nephew in Afghanistan's parliamentary elections with more than a dozen other men, mainly extended family members. That very morning, as per usual, he had called in to the district police chief to check on security before the election campaign convoy set off. The strike was an "obvious mistake," said the provincial governor, Abdul-Jabar Taqwa. "He was an ordinary person and lived among normal people," said the Takhar Chief of Police, Shah Jahaan Nuri. "I could have captured him with one phone call."
U.S. Special Forces got the wrong man, but despite overwhelming evidence, they have remained adamant that they were correct. Senior Special Forces officers' gave me lengthy accounts of the attack, including the intelligence behind it. That has allowed a piecing together of what went wrong.
Intelligence analysts were monitoring the calls of Muhammad Amin in early 2010 -- and confirmed that he really was the Taliban deputy governor of Takhar. They came to believe that one number he had called in Kabul was passed on to him. They believed he began to use this phone and to ‘self-identify' as Zabet Amanullah. In other words, they believed Muhammad Amin was using the name ‘Zabet Amanullah' as an alias.
Friends and family have confirmed that Zabet Amanullah, who was living in Kabul, was in occasional telephone contact with active members of the Taliban, but this is not unusual in a country where fortunes change and it is prudent to stay in touch with all sides. Zabet Amanullah also kept in touch with senior members in the government. What may have looked like a suspicious cluster of calls and contacts, in reality, proved nothing about the actual conduct of the caller. Zabet Amanullah's life, lived quietly and openly at home in Kabul, has been documented in detail. I met him in 2008 when he had just fled Pakistan where he had been working on a human rights project. He had been detained and severely tortured by the Pakistani intelligence agency, he believed, because he was a former Taliban commander who was not fighting.
The Special Forces unit denied that the identities of two different men, Muhammad Amin and Zabet Amanullah, could have been conflated. They insisted the technical evidence that they were one person was irrefutable. When pressed about the existence -- and death -- of an actual Zabet Amanullah, one officer said, "We were not tracking the names, we were targeting the telephones."
Yet in the complex political landscape of Afghanistan, it is not enough to track phones. It is certainly not enough to base a targeted killing on. The analysts had not built up a biography of their target, Muhammad Amin ---where he was from, what his jihadi background was, and so on. They had not been aware of the existence of a well-known person by the name of Zabet Amanullah. They had not had access to the sort of common, everyday information available to Afghans watching election coverage on television. They had not made even the most basic background checks about a target they had been tracking for months. Instead, they relied on signals intelligence and network analysis (which attempts to map insurgent networks by monitoring phone calls), without cross-checking with any human intelligence.
Dealing with the U.S. military, it has felt like we are from parallel worlds. Their Afghanistan, where knowledge is often driven largely by signals intelligence and reports provided by a very limited number of local informants, with a very narrow focus on insurgent behaviour, and the normal, everyday world of Afghan politics. In the case of the Takhar attack, these two worlds simply did not connect.
The human cost of killing ten civilians and turning forty women and children into widows and orphans is great. Legally, the magnitude of the intelligence failings may have been so great that the U.S. military violated the rules of war, whereby combatants must take all feasible precautions to protect civilians. However, there are strong indications that the flaws in intelligence highlighted by this case are systemic. Indeed, General David Petraeus spoke about this, about the U.S. military's lack of a "granular understanding of local circumstances," by chance, on the very day of the Takhar attack.
For the U.S. military, simply reiterating that they were right, in response to overwhelming evidence to the contrary is not an adequate response and will hardly reassure Afghans that similar mistakes will not be made in future.
Kate Clark, a senior analyst at the Afghanistan Analysts Network, is the author of an investigation into the Takhar airstrike, from which this is excerpted. The investigation was featured in PBS' Frontline's "Kill/Capture" documentary. Join the AfPak Channel at 1:00pm EST on May 11, 2011 for a live chat about the film with Frontline journalists Stephen Grey and Shoaib Sharifi.

"Kill Capture": A live chat with PBS' Frontline

Tonight (May 10), PBS' Frontline is airing "Kill/Capture," a six-month investigation into the U.S. military's program of targeted killings in Afghanistan. The military says these raids have taken some 12,000 insurgents off the battlefields of Afghanistan over the last year, and represent a crucial part of the U.S.'s strategy in the country. Afghan government officials, Afghan communities, and human rights groups, on the other hand, have objected to the raids on the grounds that they alienate the local population and are unduly harsh. The question is: will the kill/capture missions help end the war in Afghanistan?

"Kill/Capture" features research by Kate Clark, whose work we have regularly featured on the AfPak Channel, at the Afghanistan Analysts Network, which has just released a devastating new report investigating a U.S. airstrike in Afghanistan's Takhar province in the fall of last year, claiming that civilians were killed in a case of mistaken identity. The report is based on interviews with survivors of the airstrike, witnesses, Afghan officials, and U.S. Special Forces officers. The U.S. military insists the strike killed a senior member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Who was killed in the Takhar strike, and why?

Given that a targeted American raid recently killed al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, we have lots of questions about how these operations are authorized and carried out, and what their impact has been on both the insurgency in Afghanistan and the Afghan communities in which they occur.

Join us tomorrow (May 11) at 1:00pm EST here for a live chat with Frontline's Stephen Grey and Shoaib Sharifi. Grey is a London-based journalist who has been reporting on the Afghan war since 2007, and Sharifi is an award-winning journalist with extensive experience in Afghanistan. Watch a preview of the film here, and be sure to tune in this evening for the full show.

The white man's jihad

Up in the north of England, a trial is being heard against a group of men allegedly at the core of a cell recruiting and radicalizing individuals to fight in Afghanistan. The group, part of an ongoing trickle of people from the U.K. attracted to fighting in South Asia, is notable because it counts amongst its ranks a white convert, the latest in a long line of such individuals who have been drawn to militancy in South Asia. These reports of white converts in the region are naturally of particular concern to Western security services: their capacity to blend effortlessly back into the West makes them highly attractive weapons for groups seeking to launch terrorist attacks.
Back in mid-2009, an older moderate Muslim convert in London told me that his theory behind converts in terrorist cells was that they played a key role as catalysts. The presence of a convert, usually a zealous individual who had moved from a troubled past as drug addict or petty criminal to Islamist extremist, would reinforce the group's internal dialogue and help push them deeper into their militant ideologies.
The group who bombed London's public transport system on July 7, 2005 is the archetypal example of this. Convert Germaine Lindsay, originally of Jamaican descent, was the most overtly violent and radical of the group and may have played a role stirring the others on. According to information released during the recent Coroner's Inquest into the bombings, he was likely involved in a gun crime incident prior to the bombing, he was reported to have been active in promoting radical groups in Luton. Additionally, he was a close student of the radical preacher Abdullah el Faisal. His presence amongst the otherwise Pakistani-Beeston group would have been as an outsider, but one who was brought into the closest of confidence, suggesting an outsized influence.
In a separate case in East London, Mohammed Hamid, also known as "Osama bin London," was a "revert" who found his religion after a life of drugs and became a key figure in a radicalizing network training, amongst others, the July 21 team who tried to bomb London two weeks after the successful July 7 cell. And there are other examples. Looking at other failed plots linked to Waziristan, the 2006 plot to bomb airlines concurrently on transatlantic routes counted a couple of converts amongst plotters, and the 2007 plot to attack a U.S. airbase in Germany was conducted by a group of mostly Caucasian German converts.
On the battlefields of Afghanistan and Pakistan, however, these light-skinned converts face a high degree of skepticism: for example, Rahman Adam, aka Anthony Garcia, one of the plotters involved in the 2004 plot to blow up a British mall using a fertilizer based explosive, was initially turned away from training camps for being "too white." Adam was in fact of Algerian origin and a born Muslim; he was just very pale skinned.
Prior to al-Qaeda's attacks of September 11, 2001, the route for converts to training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan was much easier to tread. James McLintock, nicknamed the "Tartan Taliban," first joined the jihad against the Soviet Union in the late 1980s after, by his account, he met a group of young Saudi hotheads on a flight to Pakistan as he made his way to visit a University friend. Enjoying this first taste of jihad, McLintock became a feature of the European jihadi scene, joining the fighting again in Bosnia and returning regularly to Afghanistan. Back in the U.K. alongside fellow convert and jihadi traveler Martin "Abdullah" McDaid, McLintock began running study circles at the Iqra bookshop in Beeston, northern England and training camps in the nearby Lake District that were attended by some of the July 7, 2005 cell.
And in the years immediately before September 11, there was a stream of converts who showed up and were accorded quite high levels of trust by al-Qaeda. In 1997, having converted a few years earlier in Orange County, California, Adam Gadahn made his way to Pakistan and then to Afghanistan. Using contacts he had made in the U.S., he arrived and seems to have been able to fill a vital early role as translator of Arabic material into English. By 1999 converts seemed to be arriving into South Asia from all directions. Sometime in the middle of the year Christian Ganczarski, a German-Polish convert who used the same network to get to Afghanistan as the Hamburg Cell that produced Mohammed Atta, a leader of the 9/11 group, arrived in Quetta, Pakistan and after a trip back to Germany to fetch his family, moved into Osama bin Laden's compound in Afghanistan, where he acted as the I.T. guy. At around the same time, itinerant Australian jihadist David Hicks showed up and trained with Lashkar-e-Taiba near Lahore -- he tried to go and fight in Kashmir, but ended up going to train at the Al Farouq camp near Kandahar the next year, where he met a bunch of fellow peripatetic westerners including British convert Richard "shoe bomber" Reid. Early 2000, Jack Roche, a burly Australian-Brit who had converted and joined the Indonesian al-Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah, showed up on the recommendation of Hambali, the operations chief for the Indonesian group, to train and learn explosives and got to sit down and eat with Osama bin Laden.
Post-9/11 converts have continued to play a role in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but few appear to have continued to rise into senior roles as they had before. According to British security sources, one of the most senior was British-born Hindu convert Dhiren Barot, who was incarcerated in November 2006 in the U.K. after a long career as a jihadist foot soldier. Starting with fighting with Lashkar-e-Taiba in Kashmir in 1995, an experience he wrote about in his 1999 magnum opus "The Army of Madinah in Kashmir," Barot went on to help 9/11 plotter Khalid Sheikh Mohammed with his global jihadist planning.
Since 9/11 instead white converts in Afghanistan and Pakistan have mostly been foot soldiers, with the militant groups there more skeptical of converts as potential Western intelligence agents. The Caucasian-seeming Rahman Adam was unable to go and train until he had connected with established jihadist Omar Khyam. An exception to this seems to have been Bryant Neal Vinas, a Queens, New York-born kid who converted to Islam, who made his way to training camps in Pakistan in September 2007 seemingly using networks from the U.S. to establish contact with radicals. It took him a bit longer to establish his bona fides, but eventually he got to meet with an array of high- and mid-ranking al-Qaeda fighters who immediately saw his potential as an operative who could easily blend back into the West.
The Waziristan-based Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) seems to have recognized this potential in a group of German converts who showed up to fight alongside them in the mid-2000s. Having trained a group of them, they sent a cell led by converts Fritz Gelowicz and Daniel Schneider to target the U.S. base in Ramstein, Germany. Other converts linked to the group instead fell in battle, including Eric Breininger who in April 2010 died in Pakistan, while the group was initially motivated by the death in Chechnya of fellow convert Thomas Fischer in late 2003. Another just disrupted alleged German network included another convert and helping funnel fighters to South Asia.
And the trickle goes on. In July 2010, Khalid Kelly, infamous Irish convert and former member of British extremist group Al Muhajiroun, returned home to Ireland having claimed he tried to join jihadists in Pakistan (although he was interviewed in the Times in November 2009 saying he was training to go to and fight in Afghanistan). In Kelly's own words, however, "as a white convert, I stuck out like a sore thumb," so he returned to Ireland instead. Others met with messier ends: according to Pakistani intelligence reports two white British converts were killed in a drone strike in Datta Khel in December 2010.
The pre-9/11 days of converts showing up and getting to meet al-Qaeda leaders are over, but these light-skinned jihadis remain a key potential threat that militant groups will attempt to actively recruit. They both help show off the group's ongoing international appeal while also acting as excellent weapons to strike deep in the West. And until the overall threat has been eliminated, they will continue to be a feature of it.
Raffaello Pantucci is an Associate Fellow at the International Center for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR). 

Pakistani Army created and installed Taliban government

Sandy Berger, Bill Clinton’s national security advisor told 9/11 Commission in March, 2004 that ’Pakistani Army was the midwife of Taliban’. UN report on Bhutto killing confirmed this fact when it stated that ‘Pakistani Army organized Taliban and installed Taliban government in Afghanistan in 1996’.
So in a way, Pakistani government was in charge of Afghanistan when 9/11 attacks were carried out and hence Pakistani government was responsible for those attacks.
Nobody forced it but Pakistan’s democratic government of Benazir Bhutto chose of its own free will, to facilitate relocation of Osama bin Laden from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1996.
Nobody forced it but Pakistani Army and ISI created what ex-CIA official Bruce Reidel called 'this jihadist Frankenstein monster' on their own with full financing provided by Pakistan’s democratic governments during 1990s.
Osama bin Laden had publicly congratulated Pakistan in 1998 for exploding world’s first Islamic nuclear bomb.
Pakistani Army used to provide military protection to Osama bin Laden during his umpteen visits to Pakistan. Osama bin Laden has received many dialysis treatments at Pakistan’s military hospitals.
Osama bin Laden had made huge campaign contributions to Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif’s election campaigns in 1990 and 1996. Let us NOT forget that Nawaz Sharif has personally met Osama bin Laden at least three times in Saudi Arabia at Nawaz Sharif’s own request. Nobody can call Nawaz Sharif’s PML(N) a fundamentalist Islamic religious party.
Pakistani ISI Director General Mahmud Ahmad had asked Omar Sheikh (the kidnapper of Daniel Pearl) to send $100,000 from a Dubai bank account to Mohammed Atta (the lead 9/11 hijacker) one year before those attacks. Mohammad Atta used that $100,000 for flight training, living expenses and to purchase flight tickets on the day of 9/11 attacks in US and returned unspent $25,000 back to same Dubai account. Musharraf was forced to retire ISI director General Mahmud Ahmad after Wall Street Journal exposed General Ahmad as the chief financier of 9/11 attacks. Pakistani ISI was heavily involved in planning of 9/11 attacks as corroborated by former Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham.
Al Qaeda, Taliban, LeT, JeM, JuD, HuJi and countless other terror outfits have been spawned in Pakistan, the official ’terror center’ of the world as per CIA with the help, support and sanctuary provided by the Pakistani State that is owned by Pakistani Army that uses ’terrorism’ as an official tool of state policy to further its own objectives.

An open letter to Osama bin Laden

Editors note: below and reproduced in full with the author's permission is an open letter written by Noman Benotman, a former commander in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and a former associate of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. In al Qaeda strategy meetings in Kandahar in 2000, Benotman warned the al-Qaeda leadership of ‘total failure' to realise their aims and called on bin Laden and al-Zawahiri to abandon violence. Soon after the 9/11 attacks, he distanced himself from al-Qaeda and later resigned from his own jihadist organisation. He has more recently been instrumental in negotiations with Libya's government to free former LIFG leaders, and in persuading these leaders to formally renounce terrorism. He also recently joined the London-based Quilliam Foundation as a Senior Analyst.

Is it not time for believers to humble their hearts to the remembrance of
God and the Truth that has been revealed. Quran, 57:16

Dear Osama bin Laden Abu Abdullah,

I greet you with the peace of Islam and ask you to reflect on the following. Do so for the sake of Allah, his Prophet, and the safety of all humans worldwide.

I write to you as a former comrade-in-arms. We fought together. We were ready to die together. Under the banner of Islam, we came to the aid of fellow Muslims in Afghanistan. To this day, I take pride in having fought against the Soviets and communists. We were in the right and no enemy could have stood in our way.

This is no longer the case.

After our victory, we became a curse for the very people we sought to help. Afghans, including Mullah Omar and his supporters, asked us to protect their country and its people. Instead, you wanted to use their country as a launch-pad for war against America, Israel, the West and the Arab regimes. What benefit has this brought the Afghan people?

Separately, when Mullah Omar asked you on several occasions to stop provoking and inviting American attacks on his country, you ignored him. How can you claim to fight for an "Islamic State" and then so flagrantly disobey the ruler you helped put in place? Do you not remember Sheikh Abu Hafs al-Mauritani's religious opinion that by defying Mullah Omar, al-Qaeda was making a mockery of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and that building Afghanistan was the call of the hour and the duty of those Muslims who lived there - not "jihad" abroad?

I also remind you (and disclose here for the first time publicly) that in this meeting Abu Muhammad al-Zayyat, the head of your own organisation's security committee (later appointed head of the military committee in 2000), vehemently objected to your "final" planned operation, the 11th September suicide bombings. Abu Muhammad al-Zayyat believed these missions were illegitimate without Mullah Omar's permission. The question asked by many, even among the closed group, was: by what right did al-Qaeda by-pass and ignore Mullah Omar? And, of course, even if Mullah Omar had given his permission this would not change the fact that such attacks are completely unjustifiable.

Osama, you were kind enough to invite me to breakfast at your simple mud house in Kandahar in summer of 2000. I still remember your children playing barefoot near us. In our meetings, I represented the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and in the presence of Dr. Zawahiri as well as other key figures, I argued for an immediate cessation of violence and an end to al-Qaeda's attacks outside Afghanistan. You asked me to provide you with access to LIFG's global logistic network to bolster your "Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders", as you termed your ongoing war. I refused point-blank, without even seeing the need to consult my group on this decision. You saw many truths in my argument: that al-Qaeda and its violent acts had been an abject failure. However, you said that one more operation was under way, and that you could not stop it.

On the morning of 11th September 2001, the world discovered the unstoppable chain of events both you and al-Qaeda had put in place. Why was this operation carried out? What has the 11th September brought to the world except mass killings, occupations, destruction, hatred of Muslims, humiliation of Islam, and a tighter grip on the lives of ordinary Muslims by the authoritarian regimes that control Arab and Muslim states? I warned you then, in summer 2000, of how your actions would bring US forces into the Middle East and into Afghanistan, leading to mass unrest and loss of life. You believed I was wrong. Time has proved me right. Your actions have harmed millions of innocent Muslims and non-Muslims alike. How is this Islam or jihad? For how much longer will al-Qaeda continue to bring shame on Islam, disrupt ordinary Muslims' lives, and be the cause of global unrest?

Muslims across the world have rejected your calls for wrongful jihad and the establishment of your so-called "Islamic state" when they witnessed the form this has taken in Iraq. Even the Palestinians consider your "help" to have had negative repercussions on their cause. Indeed Israel's control over Gaza has never been stronger and yet some of your supporters have even declared Hamas to be an apostate organisation! What then of the rest of the Palestinian population and other Muslims? Most Muslim communities wish to embrace and engage in democracy; they seek justice, peace, freedom, human rights and peaceful coexistence with the rest of the world. Instead, where there was harmony, you brought discord.

In New York, your un-Islamic actions have caused hurt, loss, pain and anguish to thousands of innocent people and their families. One consequence is that those Muslims seeking to build a House of God in New York are today being compared to Nazis. And now we hear that on the anniversary of your attack an American preacher is even planning to burn the Quran in revenge! Indeed Muslims living in democratic and free societies around the world are now experiencing the consequences of your irresponsible acts. In Switzerland and France, countries in which Muslims were able to freely and openly practise their religion, they have been forced to abandon symbols of their faith. In China, our brothers and sisters face daily oppression by the Communist government on account of al-Qaeda's actions elsewhere. In Iraq, a proud and noble nation, an entirepopulation lives in fear of takfir (excommunication) and daily suicide bombings. In Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and other countries, people live in fear of men who believe they are allowed to commit murder in the name of Islam and take lives in exchange for their own shahada (martyrdom). Is this really the path to paradise? On this issue, I strongly advise you to seek the guidance of authentic scholars for "a Muslim can still be saved as long as he does not spill inviolable blood" (Sahih Bukhari).

I know you to be a humble man, one who has given up a luxurious lifestyle to dedicate yourself to the cause you believe in. However, your jihad should now ensure al-Qaeda reverts back to the path of ahl al sunnawal jama‘a (the people who follow the example of the Prophet and the majority) and realigns its acts and policies with authentic Islamic rulings.

Your duty is to prevent your organisation from going further down the
road of extremism (ghuluw), ex-communication (takfir) and the shedding
of innocent blood that was forbidden by God.

In light of all these points, I recommend that al-Qaeda announce a unilateral halt to its military operations for a period of six months, for the following three purposes:

- To take a step back from fighting to study and consider the organization's vision, approach and strategy; for instance by attempting to answer the following questions: How would a suspension of al-Qaeda's military activity affect Islam and Muslims around the world? Will it hurt their interests or will it allow them to make greater progress towards achieving peace and the freedom to practice and preach their religion? What would Islam lose if al-Qaeda were to end its violence?
- To explore public opinion in Muslim communities around the world and their position vis- à-vis al-Qaeda, in terms of support or rejection on both the ideological and operational levels.
- To seek the guidance of those scholars such as Sheikh Salman al- Auda who have rejected your approach and concept of jihad, as well as others who are ‘accepted as speaking with the voice of the Ummah' (Talaqqathum al-umma bil qabul).

I believe that adopting this strategy will also be the first step towards ending the occupation of Afghanistan and establishing peace and securityin the region.

In urging you to halt your violence and re-consider your aims and strategy, I believe I am merely expressing the views of the vast majorityof Muslims who wish to see their religion regain the respect it has lost and who long to carry the name of "Muslim" with pride.

In peace,
Abu Muhammed Al-Libi
Noman Benotman

10 September 2010
1 Shawwal 1431 AH
ALEX FUCHS/AFP/Getty Images
Related Posts Plugin for WordPress, Blogger...